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Summary:
The enactment of the 3R and 4R Acts by Congress led the states to develop rail plans in
order to qualify for Federal assistance for the retention of lines excluded from CONRAIL
or subsequently abandoned. The majority of the states have now issued their plans, and
the 3R area states have completed their third updates. The states differ very widely
in their attitudes toward the excluded and endangered light traffic lines. The New
England states, most mid-Atlantic states, and several midwest states have planed an active
role in attempting to save light traffic lines. Several of the western and southern
states, however, have been unsympathetic to any active role in retaining lines that
would otherwise be abandoned. Examination of the excluded and endangered lines on the
basis of information in the state rail plans shows a considerable iileage with benefits
of retention in excess of costs, but many of these require continuing subsidy. Most
states, however, regard the subsidy program as only transitional and are emphasizing
rehabilitation of lines rather than operating subsidies.
i:"j
State Rail Plans*
John F. Due
University of Illinois
In the last century, various states, in an effort to speed economic
development, encouraged the huilding of railroad lines and in some
instances constructed lines themselves. Michigan, for example, built
two lines, later sold to predecessors of the New York Central; Illinois
had several major projects but built relatively little; Pennsylvania, "
North Carolina, Georgia, and other states were also involved. But no
state continued to operate these" lines (although Georgia has retained '?"'
ownership of its line). Cities also undertook construction, Baltimore " r
(Western Maryland), and Cincinnati (Cincinnati Southern, no* operated '<-
as part of the Southern Railway system) being the prime examples, but (>>•
they likewise did not operate them. The states moved on from promotion " ,:
to regulation, commencing in New England, and then in the midwest (the
Granger laws) and California., but in turn gradually lost most of their
regulatory powers to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Thus by the
1960s the states regarded the; railroads essentially as objects to tax
and to reguiate in the few ways left to them, not as an activity to pro-
mote or assist or even consider how they were affected by other state
policies such as highway building. When railroads attempted to abandon
lines the states and particularly the local communities fought' "the '•"•"
proposals but did not come up with other alternatives.
*This paper is based upon work prepared by the author for the National
Transportation Policy Study Commission and is used by permission of the
Commission. The material in no way reflects the views of the Commission
or its staff. The author is indebted to Professor Robert Harris of
the University of California, Berkeley, for his comments on an earlier
version of the paper.
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Robert J. Parks, Democracy's Railroads
,
(Port Washington, NY:
Kennikat Press 1972).
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The Beginnings of Change
With the decline in railroad profitability, particularly in the
east and northeast, and threatened loss of substantial rail mileage,
slight indications of change sere evident. The abandonment of the
Rutland, one of the three most extensive rail abandonments to occur
to that date, led the state of Vermont to act and buy the main line
in 1963-64, leasing it to two operating firms. In the same period,
the state of New York bought the Long Island Railroad, primarily a
commuter operation but also a freight carrier, and turned it over to
the Transit Authority for operation. When Amtrak was established,
the law contained provisions for operation of additional trains under
state subsidy, and New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, California,
Illinois and Minnesota participated in the program.
But the major change came with the collapse of the Penn Central and
the 3R and 4R legislation. The acts provided for a system of Federal
subsidy for light traffic lines that the states and/or local govern-
ments wished to retain, for a temporary (initially 3, then under the 4R
Act, 5 year) period. But in order to obtain this subsidy, the states
were required to develop state rail plans for approval by the Federal
Railroad Administration of the Department of Transportation. The plans
must be updated annually. The Federal government prescribes rather
precisely the nature of the plan volumes.
As of January 1, 1979, the states affected by the 3R Act have
completed their third updates, and a number of other states have
completed their first plans, or at least Work Progress Statements.
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This paper provides a survey and analysis of the approaches and
policies of 37 states, 6 of these having progress statements only, the
remainder plans and plan updates. All states affected by the 3R Act
are included, plus those western, southern and Neve England states from
which plans were available.
The plans are prepared, in most states, by the State Department of
Transportation; where no such agency has been formed, commonly by the
State Highway Department. The majority are prepared by state personnel,
some with assistance from outside consulting firms, and a few entirely
by consulting firms (e.g., Florida). Because of the Federal require-
ments and suggestions, there are many common elements, including a
description of the existing rail system (in some states, e.g., Maine,
very detailed), and a statement of goals and objectives, stressing the
importance of the rail system to the economy of the state and of pre-
serving a viable private enterprise rail system. Almost all regard
state assistance programs as of a temporary, transitional nature. The
primary emphasis is upon light traffic lines, since these are the ones
for which subsidy is available. Some include analysis of all of the
endangered lines—those for which abandonment has been approved or
requested, those contemplated for abandonment in the next three years
(category 1) or under consideration (category 2). Others have limited
In addition to the 3R states, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, North
Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Tennessee, Missouri,
Kansas, Minnesota, South Dakota, Arizona, Washington, Idaho, and Oregon
provided rail plans, and Nebraska, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, Texas,
and Wyoming, progress reports. Some other state plans are completed but
were not made available,.
2
J. F. Due, DOT's Classification of Rail Lines, The Prospective Abandon-
ment Proposals of the Railroads, and the Hall Commission Report , University
of Illinois, College of Commerce, Working Paper #461, Urbana, 1978.
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their first plans to lines actually up for abandonment currently or for
which abandonment has been approved. Analysis of the results of the
subsidized lines is included in the plan updates of the 3R area states.
An important background element for an understanding of the plans
is the existence in several states of constitutional restrictions on
their ability to participate in the programs. The constitutions of Ohio
and Washington bar both the states and local governments from giving
aid to private enterprise (although Ohio can purchase rail lines). In
Arizona state aid to corporations is barred. Virginia cannot use state
funds for internal improvements except roads and parks, and Kansas can
use funds only for waterways and highway improvements, but in neither
state are the local governments so restricted. In other states in the
sample there are no constitutional barriers, and some of the legisla-
tures (and in Maryland the voters) have given very broad powers to the
state transportation departments to participate in the programs.
The General Attitude of the States Toward Assistance of Rail Lines
A very wide range of attitudes toward the programs is to be found
in the various states. In general, strongest acceptance is to be found
in the eastern states, hardest hit by rail bankruptcies and prospective
and actual abandonments. Vermont, Connecticut, and Massachusetts are
perhaps the most enthusiastic, stressing that the programs seek to phase
in the deteriorated lines, not phase them out. New York and Pennsylvania,
although now not as enthusiastic as initially, have active programs, and
Maryland, Delaware and Virginia have cooperated to save the Delmarva
i
lines. West of the Alleghanies, Michigan has been the most active and
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enthusiastic; Wisconsin, Illinois, South Dakota, Iowa, Minnesota, and
Oregon all express sympathetic attitudes toward rail programs. The
problems, of course, differ widely; South Dakota is faced with the pos-
sible loss of half its rail mileage, Wyoming with very little. Indiana,
Ohio, and New Jersey, while participating, have not shown sympathy that
other eastern states have. Several states take a negative view, even
for their endangered lines: Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Arizona, Nevada,
and Washington. Some of these have few or no deteriorated lines and
little threat of abandonment, but others, such as Missouri, face more
significant problems. This difference in attitude, while explainable
partly by circumstances of the rail systems of the states, also reflects
general differences in philosophy of the state governments and specifi-
cally of those persons making the decisions. The sharp difference in
attitude between Oregon and Washington, and between Illinois and Indiana,
for example, cannot be explained in any other way.
The Approaches
The 4R Act provided Federal assistance for four purposes, in addi-
tion to preparation of plans:
1. Subsidies to ensure continued operation under the 4R Act.
The Federal share was 100% the first year, dropping to 80%
and then to 70%, the original program expiring in 1981. The
1978 legislation extends the program, but subsidy on any
line is limited to three years.
2. Funds for rehabilitation of lines. As a result of the 1978
legislation, this program will continue indefinitely, the
1Local Rail Services Assistance Act, 1978.
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Federal government providing 80% of the funds—but a limited
total amount.
3. Funds for acquisition of lines.
A. Funds for provision of alternative means, such as loading
docks on other lines.
The states have differed greatly in their relative emphasis on these
alternatives, partly in view of circumstances of the lines (some states
have little or no need for rehabilitation of track, all of which is in
acceptable condition). But beyond this, the choice has been dictated
by the attitudes of the decision makers. The difference is in emphasis;
many states use more than one approach or plan to do so. The current
trend is toward increased stress on rehabilitation.
Continuation Subsidies
When the 3R Act was passed, the immediate task was to ensure con-
tinued operation of lines that were excluded from CONRAIL but which the
states, local governments, and /or shippers regarded as essential. The
only way to ensure continued operation was the provision of a subsidy
to cover deficits.
The states fall into four patterns in their attitudes toward these
subsidies:
Ten 3R states have used state funds to provide the subsidies. Six
of these (Rhode Island, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Delaware
and Illinois), plus Vermont, have, with minor exceptions provided all
of the necessary non Federal funds. New York did so initially, but
has moved toward "negotiated solutions", under which the state will
1For example, Oregon has very little mileage below Class II standards,
-7-
Federal share from state sources, shippers being required to provide
the other half. Wisconsin has subsidized car ferry operations. All
of these states indicate the desirability of eliminating the subsidy
by restoring the lines to profitable operation, but four, Michigan,
Vermont, Connecticut and Wisconsin, indicate willingness to provide
subsidy on essential lines over a substantial period of time. Indiana
has likewise provided subsidy from state funds but stresses that this
is a temporary transitional policy and is moving toward shipper finan-
cing. A second group of states, in territory not covered by the 3R
Act, indicates willingness to provide subsidies for essential lines
but stresses that no long term subsidy is anticipated: Minnesota,'
South Dakota, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Tennessee, New Hampshire, and
West Virginia. Most of these states will require shipper participation.
A third group either will not for policy reasons or cannot for
constitutional reasons provide state funds, but encourages local and/or
shipper financing of the subsidy: Maryland (counties), Virginia
(district), Louisiana, Nevada, Florida, New Jersey, Ohio (shippers)
Nebraska, and Oregon (at least initially). The general reasoning
followed is that the benefits from continuation are primarily local
rather than statewide, and if local sources provide the funds, they
will be more concerned about increasing the traffic. Some state
administrations are reluctant to ask their legislatures for funds,
given the prevalent anti-tax attitude.
The final group opposes any operating subsidies as a matter of
principle, condemming them as mere palliatives—though these states
will not prevent local groups from providing them: Arizona, Kansas,
Georgia, and Washington.
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Subsidy to date has been limited to the states covered by the
3R Act; as of early 1979, other states are just commencing to con-
sider or establish them. Table 1 presents a summary of the actions
and Table 2, the expenditures. The data are not summarized in most
state plans but were compiled from information on the various subsidized
lines; they may not be entirely accurate but give an approximate figure.
The numbers-of-lines figures are not consistent among states or even
over time within a state because of varying interpretation of what
constitutes a "line".
Success with the programs has varied. It is not possible to
review the experience in detail, but some observations are feasible.
Several of the eastern states particularly affected by the formation
of CONRAIL sought to retain a substantial portion of the mileage
excluded from CONRAIL. Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island
retained under subsidy much of the excluded mileage (and as noted
below) have purchased various lines. These programs are all being
continued, and despite problems, particularly in rehabilitation, are
considered by the states to be successful. Michigan sought to retain
a substantial portion of the excluded lines, including the entire
Ann Arbor and the Great Lakes ferry system, initially retaining under
subsidy 854 miles, although recognizing that some should be phased
out. Illinois retained over half of the excluded mileage (and most
of the rest was absorbed by other roads) and continues to subsidize
this mileage. Two lines are close to becoming profitable.
Delaware, Maryland,, and Virginia cooperated to retain the Delmarva-
Cape Charles through route, including the ferry, and the East Shore
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TABLE 2
Total Freight Continuation Subsidies, Year Ending in 1978
Total Subsidy as
a Percentage of
Subsidy Total State Tax
Amount of Subsidy Per Mile Collections for
State 000 Subsidized
$ 9,530
1978
Connecticut $ 324 .2
Delaware 220 4,489 .2
Maryland 1,019 6,290 .1
Massachusetts 885 11,645 .02
Illinois 1,046 5,716 .02
Indiana 4,686
11,903
39,712,
10,722
.2
Michigan .3
New Jersey 415 15,444 .01
Neu York 4,319 8,338 .04
Ohio 1,562 8,726 .03
Pennsylvania ^1,345
525
3,022 .02
Vermont 1,895 .2
Rhode Island v30 1,364
'
neg.
Virginia 700
1,300
7,609 .04
Wisconsin —— .05
1. Car ferry only.
2. Including car ferries.
3. Expected 1:o fall to $118,000 in 1979.
4. Excluding car ferries.
Source: State Rail Plans, 1977 and 1978 updates.
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branches and have been successful, despite problems with bad track and
earlier inadequate cooperation from CONRAIL.
New York initially was overambitious , taking the view that all of
the excluded lines were viable. About half of the excluded mileage was
in fact subsidized, but the state pushed very rapidly toward negotiated
solutions, whereby the railroads, shippers, and labor must agree on a
solution to retain a line without state subsidy, following state aid
for rehabilitation. The traffic has tended to decline, and more lines
have been eliminated than anticipated, but there has been substantial
rehabilitation and rationalization and reduction in unneeded mileage
by creating new connections. The general attitude is that while the
original program attempted too much, a number of essential lines have
been saved.
Pennsylvania's philosophy was somewhat similar, except that it re-
quires the shippers to finance one half of the non Federal subsidy share.
A large number of lines were retained under subsidy, many of them very
short, but each year several have been dropped, either because the
shippers would not put up the funds or new connections made segments
unnecessary. As subsequently noted, the state has purchased substantial
mileage.
New Jersey, which subsidizes passenger commuter service extensively,
will not use state funds to subsidize freight service. A relatively
small mileage was retained under shipper and Federal subsidy. Vermont,
which subsidizes only state owned lines, has provided substantial amounts
for the Lamoille Valley, line, but no subsidy has been needed for the ex-
Rutland lines.
12-
In tha midwe t reit lei Ohio r/ir Indi<- n^ hava been rs enthusiastic
as their r. 5igh,o. s Phi' *_s li&ayered by ;or sti-utionai *et,tr i -tions
that make it- impossi" le <_" tj pa.'s '-. «al ^oney t^rou^h the state to
railroads. But it has facilitated shipper participation. The mileage
subsidized has fallen s eadily, as shippers have been unwilling to pro-
vide the larger amouits as the Feder© I share fell. Indiana was in danger
of losing come major branch lines, but the state was unsympathetic to
the subsidy trogra. from the beginning, stressing the argument that the
railroads should be required to cross subsidize unprofitable but essential
lines. But the state did subsid, re some 15 lines. Except on two lines,
traffic fell, and 5 linet: were dis ontinued at the end of the first year.
The following year (1978) t\e resu' •-' -iere less di ^appoint^g, and three
additional lines were brought back into service, but with shipper sub-
sidy only.
Table 3 ad' -ates the traffic originated/terminated by the subsi-
dized lin^nr 10 ': fall within the rpnge between 10 and 40 carloads
per mile, ar r ^ ""d I'-i expected, These are the marginal lirer, carrying
enough tr^.^'L<, , be of s5 [3nif''.car.c^ o &i, .pourt but nc< trough, under
usual conditio. co be p. writable. Out 30 c>f the l ? nes—32 percent
of the total—h a traific .n ex^ass oi 10 car-, and a third of these,
over 100—a tra. f _c volume that c) ould be profitable, av \ retention of
the lines is rlriost certain to be jcoi -r^ically justifiable.
It must bi ricoguized or conrro, tha 4- cc_s ojiginat d/terminated
per mile i cr.'y a very cri-de marsve o:' traffic uu: 1 :y but it is
the only me?sut'? f ener^lly Ermilc 1 "> in tl.a _ate rail ,r';.ans. Net ton
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TABLE 3
Traffic Density of Subsidized Lines,
Latest Year Available (1977-78, 1978-79)
Carloads
Originated/
Terminated
Per Mile
PA NY OH RI MI VT MA IL Toti
Under 5 1 3 4
5-9 2 2 2 1 7
10-15 6 2 1 1 1 11
16-20 5 3 3 1 2 2 16
21-30 5 4 6 1 16
31-40 3 3 2 1 9
A1-50 1 1 2
51-75 7 3 1 1 2 1 15
76-100 2 2 1 5
Over 100 5 1 2 1 1 10
Median 29 26 22 — 8 — 27 20 22
Total 95
Source: State Rail Plans 1978, and Updates, 1977, 1978.
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miles per mile, a much better measure, depends not only upon cars ori-
ginated/terminated, but also on the total mileage of the line, the
average lengtb of haul on the line, and the average tonnage per car.
But even net ton miles per mile is not an adequate measure, since the
off-line mileage of the traffic handled on the lines will vary substan-
tially, as well as the cost of operating the line, the frequency of
service required, and the revenue per ton mile, which is dependent
upon the commodities handled, intermodal competition, and the general
freight rate structure affecting the line.
On the whole, to date, the subsidy program would appear to be clearly
justifiable, in saving a number of lines of obvious economic significance.
But some programs were overambitious, including lines of limited traffic
potential. But the main lesson from the data is that the great majority
of the lines are likely to be in the range in which they are not quite
self supporting yet may be economically justified.
Analysis by the States of Endangered Lines
Most of the states have commenced to review the lines that for which
abandonment has just been approved or abandonment has been requested,
and, in many states, the other endangered lines—those in Categories 1
and 2. The proposed abandonment of the portion of the Milwaukee west
of Montana plus many lines of that road in other states has greatly in-
creased concern over the endangered category.
Table 4 shows the traffic originated/terminated on the endangered
lines analyzed (many of the weakest lines were not included at all in
the analysis). The median is only 12 cars per mile, half of that for
the currently subsidized lines.
-15-
TABLR 4
traffic Originated/Terminated on Endangered Lines,
States Not Affected by 3R Act
Carloads
Originated/
Terminated
Per Mile 1
IL
#
WI
#
MN SD
Number
TN* LA WA
of Li
MO
nes
AL OR wv KS ID Tot;
Under 5 6 6 2 1 1 9 1 7 9 1 3 8 54
5-9 5 5 5 4 1 4 1 2 1 28
10-15 3 8 1 5 1 2 2 1 1 2 26
16-20 2 5 4 2 1 1 1 16
21-30 3 5 2 7 3 1 21
31-40 2 4 1 1 1 2 11
41-50 3 1 1 1 1 7
51-75 3 1 1 5
76-100 2 1 3
Over 100 3 1 4 8
Med ian 8 21 7 16 21 26 — 9 4 — 12
Total 179
//
Affected to a limited extent by the 3R Act.
*Including one Virginia line.
Latest year available, typically 1977.
-16-
Table 5 shows the proposed action by the states on the endangered
lines. For the states as a group, no action to save the lines was pro-
posed on 48% of the mileage, possible action to retain on 35%, the rest
for rail banking or further consideration. Some states, such as South
Dakota, proposed action to retain half or more; others, such as Arizona,
did not propose retention of any. Of the states with current subsidy
programs that have reviewed endangered lines, neither Michigan (5 llnes)-
nor Virginia (4 lines, 47 miles) proposed retention of any (except a
one half mile segment in Michigan). New York state expressed no objec-
tion to abandonment of 11 lines in Category 1, but to all lines proposed
in Category 2. Ohio examined 28 lines, 430 miles, in 1978, and proposed
subsidy—if shippers will provide the money—for 12 lines, 331 miles.
Maryland with 8 segments with 86 miles concluded that 5, with 60 miles,
warrant subsidy (but the state does not provide funds).
The states not covered or only partially covered by the 3R Act fall
into two patterns: those with most of the lines under 15 cars (Oregon,
Idaho, Washington, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri, and Kansas)
and the majority over 15, in South Dakota, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and
Louisiana. This difference reflects in part the policy of the Illinois
Central
.
Gulf
,
particularly in Louisiana, seeking to abandon lines that
are profitable but earning less return than other lines requiring capi-
tal, the same policy of the Milwaukee, and the seriously deteriorated
condition of many of the light traffic lines in South Dakota and portions
of the other states, which will necessitate large reinvestments If the
lines are to stay in service.
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Table 6 shows the relationship of the cars originated/terminated
and the subsidy per car necessary to keep the line in operation. The
precision of the results is lessened by the variation among the states
in the extent to which rehabilitation costs are included; for the most
part these are excluded as being a temporary element. No adjustment
is made for varying length of lines.
Thus, with lines under a 5 car density, 18 of the 22 lines require
a subsidy over $1,300 per car per year, and 21 of the 22 over $600; these
are prohibitive figures, except for very short periods and would never
be paid by shippers except under the most unusual circumstances.
Of the 11 to 2 4 group, 56% require a subsidy in excess of $300,
while of the 25 to 50 group, 76% require less than $300; over 51, 98%
require less than $300 a car, 77% under $100—and many of these, nothing.
Table 7, using the data of three states, Michigan, Wisconsin, and
Illinois, shows the relationship between the traffic and the benefit-
cost ratio and produces results similar to those of Table 6, though
with some deviations. Of the lines with less than 5 cars, 13 of 18
have a B/C ratio under .5 and of the 5 to 9 group 13 of 19 have a
figure under 1. Of lines with more than 15 cars, all except 2 of the
40 lines have figures in excess of 1, and 16 have figures in excess of
4, indicating justification for retention, even though a substantial
number of these lines would require subsidy in excess of amounts shippers
are likely to be willing to pay. Most of the other states do not pro-
vide comparable B/C ratios; figures for Ohio were omitted because the
formula is such that raqst subsidized lines show a figure under 1.
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TABLE 6
Relationship Between the Traffic Originated/ Terminated
and the Subsidy Required Per Loaded Car,
As Shown in State Rail Plans
Subsidy Required
per Car, Dollars Cars Originated/Terminated Per Mile of Line, Per Year
Under 5 5-10 11-24 25-50 51-100 over 100 TOTAL
Under $100 9 15 17 19 60
100-300 4 23 14 7 3 51
301-600 1 11 29 7 1 49
601-1000 3 18 10 2 33
over 1000 18 10 1 29
Source: State Rail Plans and Updates , Minnesota, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Michigan, Maryland, New York, Wisconsin, South Dakota, Louisiana, Missouri, Ohio,
Vermont. Both subsidized lines and endangered lines are included.
TABLE 7
Relationship Between the Traffic Originated/Terminated
and the Benefit Cost Ratio, States of
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Illinois
Benefit/ Cars Orig;inated/Te rminated Per Mile
Cost Ratio
Under 5 5-9 10-15 16-30 31-75 Over 75
Under .5 13 4 4 2
.5-1 1 9 4
1.1-2 4 2 2 7 5
2.1-4 3 1 8 2
Over 4 1 1 3 9 4
Source: State Rail Plans.
-20-
The Rehabilitation Approach
Directly and immediately the lines excluded from CONRAIL could be
saved only by operating subsidy, and this is true of some lines for which
abandonment is currently sought in other areas. But it was widely recog-
nized that many of the excluded and endangered lines had lost traffic
and experienced higher costs because of badly deteriorated track. In
fact many of the lines the states sought to retain were not operable
because of the track condition. For example, in .Connecticut , virtually
all of the excluded mileage was below Class I standards. The Delmarva
lines were in similar condition, as is true of many branch lines in the
midwest.
Thus the principle has been accepted in many states that if the
lines are rehabilitated, subsidy will no longer be necessary, a premise
that is not necessarily valid. In addition, shippers will be given
confidence that the lines will be continued indefinitely. All of the
states that have programs under way have used some of the Federal money
for this purpose, and most have provided the nonstate share themselves.
Massachusetts, for example, is supplying substantial funds to rehabili-
tate all of the retained lines, some to Class II standards. Of the
-"••.
states not yet involved in the program, several stress this approach
(Georgia, for example) in lieu of operating subsidy. Many of the
Rocky Mountain and Pacific states, however, have little or no deterio-
rated mileage.
The state of Iowa developed a program of rehabilitation of deteri-
orated light traffic lines well before the enactment of the 4R Act, and
this has been carried forward. This approach involves a contractual
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agreeraent for rehabilitation of a line whereby the shippers, the rail-
road and the state each provide one third of the funds, the shippers
being subsequently repaid on the basis of traffic. Any increased revenues
from the project are shared with the state, thus returning the funds for
use in upgrading other lines.
Two states in the sample stress the use of this approach in the •-.,
rehabilitation of rail lines, either endangered lines or deteriorating
ones: Minnesota and South Dakota. The former has allocated $3 million
a year for this purpose; agreements have been concluded on two lines
and near completion on a third. Louisiana also is considering this
approach for rehabilitation.
A basic difficulty with both the 3R and 4R Acts was that Federal
funds could be utilized only after abandonment had been approved—yet
the optimal time for rehabilitation was prior to this point. The 1978
Local Rail Services Assistance Act eliminated the abandonment require-
ment and allows use of Federal funds on local rail lines with gross ton
miles per mile under 3 million, and with Federal approval, from 3 to 5
million. Furthermore, the program is now established as a permanent
one. The ratio of Federal assistance has been set at 80.
A major question that can be raised is: if lines can be made pro-
fitable by rehabilitation, why did the railroads allow them to deteriorate
and why do they not rehabilitate them on their own? The roads allowed
the lines to deteriorate because they were relatively short of funds,
and they do not rehabilitate them because of the shortage of capital.
Suoh. capital as they have access to is devoted to the most pressing needs,
often on main lines. Furthermore, governments can of course raise funds
more cheaply than hard pressed private firms.
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Acquisition of Lines
While rehabilitation funds are provided or will be provided in a
number of states, actual state acquisition of lines—right of way, track,
and in some instances equipment—is a policy accepted by a smaller number
of states, and views differ sharply. Some acquisition, as noted, by
states such as Vermont, predated the 3R and 4R Acts. Vermont had acquired
two major routes, 277 miles, 37% of the rail mileage in the state, in
1963-64 and 1973, for a total of $3.9 million. Under the provision of
the Acts, little mileage has actually been acquired to date, partly be-
cause of difficult negotiations between Penn Central, owner of most of
the excluded lines, and the states.
Currently to date, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania have been
the most active. A prime goal of the state is to assure the shippers of the
permanence of the lines. A major obstacle to the building up of traffic
on subsidized and endangered lines is that the assistance will not con-
tinue. Connecticut has followed a policy of seeking to purchase all of
the subsidized lines plus a substantial mileage of abandoned lines and
rights of way. Massachusetts has already purchased three of the subsidized
lines and some nonoperated mileage and plans to purchase the remaining sub-
sidized mileage. Rhode Island has purchased one of the three excluded
lines, has been negotiating for a second, and was willing to purchase the
third, which was acquired by a short line. New Jersey stresses acquisition
of passenger trackage as well as light density rail freight lines. Penn-
sylvania and SEPTA—Southeast Pennsylvania Transportation Authority—like-
wise followed the policy of acquiring excluded mileage. New Hampshire has
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purchased two lines and leased them to short line operators, and West
Virginia has acquired and is operating one line and negotiating for a
second.
Other states have placed less stress on this approach. Michigan
acquired a portion of the former Ann Arhor trackage and is considering
the acquisition of additional lines for rail banking or short line
operation. Ohio is now acquiring some mileage, partly for rail banking,
partly for operated lines. Delaware, Wisconsin, Virginia and Maryland
are considering limited acquisition. New York, which earlier acquired
the Long Island and the non-operated Lake Placid branch, was unwilling
to acquire trackage on the grounds that other uses of the funds are more
essential. But the 1978 Plan Update indicates that this policy is being
reevaluated. The state estimates that $50 million would be required to
purchase the relevant lines. Several states indicate specifically that
they will not consider purchase and others do not mention the option.
Table 8 shows planned expenditure for rehabilitation and acquisition,
as of 1978.
Methodology for Establishing Priorities
Since Federal funds are limited, the states obviously had to
establish priorities for selection of lines to be retained, at least
with the aid of Federal funds, and, as a practical matter, with their
own funds as well. The methodology was suggested to the states by
the Rail Services Planning Office in 1975, and the various items
suggested are mentioned in most of the plans, although with varying
Guide for Evaluating the Community Impact of Rail Service Discon-
tinuance
, January 10, 1975.
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TABLE 8
Planned Expenditures for Rehabilitation and
Acquisition of Rail Freight Lines, 1978
State Planned Expenditures,
Rehabilitation
Planned Expenditures,
Acquisition of Lines
Thousands of Dollars*
Connecticut
Indiana
Maryland
Michigan
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Virginia
Wisconsin
Massachusetts
Vermont
Rhode Island
Neu Hampshire
West Virginia
1, 662
643
6, 818
9, 599
1, 932
094X14,
na _
8282,
1,,422
4, 386
6, 0005
1
=
,897
na
4, 000
2,492
2,748
75
2
5, 500,
4,558
6,992
4
4,206
3,900
400
1,310
650
*1977-78 fiscal year unless otherwise noted.
1. Projected, as of 1978 update.
2. Funds allocated.
3. Estimated, on lines that will likely rehabilitate and/or acquire.
4. Appropriated.
5. Total program for the Lamoille Valley.
Source: State Rail Plans.
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emphasis. This guide was reinforced and elaborated on by the Rail
Planning Manual issued by the Federal Railroad Administration. But
the exact approaches vary substantially, and they do not lend them-
selves to a neat classification. The 1978 legislation prescribes a
benefit/cost formula more precisely.
All of the approaches involve some consideration of the benefits
from retention of a line and the costs of preserving it. On the benefit
side, the major elements mentioned—but with varying stress—are as
follows:
1. Potential loss in jobs and wages, both directly from firms
closing down and indirectly from the effects of the direct
loss. The former was; calculated from shipper surveys of the
effects of loss of rail service, the latter on the basis of
a formula relating d:Lrect and indirect jobs.
2. Consequent increase in welfare and related payments.
3. Loss in tax revenue
—
property, income, in some instances,
sales.
4. Additional transportation cost, with comparison of the costs
by rail and the next -cheapest mode (truck to railhead, truck
to water transport, all-truck).
5. Additional highway maintenance costs.
These were all quantifiable in dollar terms (wage, not job, loss).
Attention was also given to less quantifiable (in monetary terras) ele-
ments: pollution, energy uss, noise.
Abandonment causes energy-use and pollution deterioration only if
rail traffic per train exceeds several cars per train, the exact
figure depending on the circumstances and whether trucking is to the
nearest rail head or to destination.
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Substantial estimation is involved in establishing these benefits.
Experience shoves that shippers may overstate the adverse effects that
loss of the rail line will have on them
—
given their desire to retain
the line
.
On the cost side, the figure typically used is that of the amount
necessary to cover the deficit from continued operation, calculated
with and/or without rehabilitation. Initially, the required subsidy
was calculated with the use of the RSPO formula of avoidable cost.
But there are arbitrary elements involved, particularly the off
branch costs of handling traffic to or from the line, and New York
State has objected to the RSPO formula on this basis. After a line
is actually subsidized, the railroad operating the line provides the
figure, calculated on the RSPO formula, but the arbitrary elements
remain. If operation is taken over by a short line, the deficit can
be more precisely calculated, but the amount depends upon the reason-
ableness of the rate division, if any.
The techniques vary:
1. Pure Benefit-Cost. Michigan comes closest to using a strict
benefit-cost approach. Four of the elements noted above are added to
obtain the benefit figure: net decline in personal income, additional
unemployment compensation, loss in income and property tax revenue,
added transport cost. This is compared with the necessary subsidy.
The railroads are increasingly reluctant to give short lines a share
of the .ioint rate, thus requiring the short line to charge an add-on
rate.
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2. Benefit/Cost and other elements. Several states employ the
B/C figure along with other elements. Illinois, for example, weights
equally the B/C figure, potential for viahility of the line, the
future relationship of the line to the rail network, and ability of
other forms of transport to meet needs of shippers. The last, in turn,
depends mainly on the condition of roads and bridges. Wisconsin uses
B/C along with other elements relating to local participation, future
viability, necessary period of subsidy, and distance from other lines.
Pennsylvania uses the B/C figure but stresses subsidy per carload and
subsidy per mile (inversely). The present Ohio system is basically a
B/C system, but a line will be included only with a written commitment
from the shippers to provide the non Federal funds. Washington uses a
similar system.
3. Weighted Index System. In an effort to avoid overweighting the
quantifiable elements, New York, Wisconsin until 1978, Kansas, Delaware
and New Jersey use a ranking system. The various lines are ranked for
each of the elements considered—and these are essentially the same as
in the approaches noted above. New York, for example, ranks the lines
by five categories: business and employment effects, additional consumer
cost (from higher transport cost), decline in property tax base, changes
in annual sales volume, and pollution effects. The various categories
are then weighted on the basis of the relative importance attached to
each by a sample of persons. Kansas includes also the volume of traffic
on the line, effects on deaths and injuries, and subsidy per mile re-
quired.
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4. Less Formal Systems. A number of states, especially in the
west and south, have not yet developed any precise formula. Many of
the elements already noted are included, but with varying emphasis.
Massachusetts stresses job losses, as does Florida. Both Minnesota
and South Dakota stress the importance of maintaining an overall state
network, shipper interest, and future viability. The viability—ability
to come off subsidy—is stressed in a number of states as well, as for
example, Louisiana, Virginia, Nebraska, and Idaho.
The differences in stress in part reflects circumstances: job
losses are particularly serious in Massachusetts, and the danger of
loss of rail service in extensive areas of the state in South Dakota.
Lessons from the Experience
There are several major conclusions that can be drawn from the
experience with state rail planning and programs to date.
First, the experience with the subsidized lines and the analysis
of the endangered lines shows that a significant portion of the lines
excluded from CONRAIL or which the roads seek to abandon have sufficient
traffic that they should be self supporting—and significant economic
waste would result from abandonment.
Secondly, on the other hand, a substantial mileage of the endangered
lines have so little traffic that retention is clearly unwarranted; the
fact that the lines have survived this long is evidence of the slowness
with which many railroads acted to eliminate light traffic lines; very
few of these lines had ever been subject to abandonment requests*
-
:
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Third, a major portion—at least half—of the subsidized and en-
dangered lines are strictly marginal, with sufficient traffic that
shippers and communities will be injured by abandonment, yet the traffic
is not such as to allow them to be self supporting. These lines require
careful benefit-cost analysis to determine those that warrant continued
subsidization.
Fourth, state experience with subsidization thus far has been very
mixed. Some states were overambitious initially and have cut back.
Others have seen the traffic on the subsidized lines fall. But other
lines have experienced traffic increases; some are off or about to come
off subsidy; and some states are well satisfied with their programs.
Fifth, it is clear that some of the excluded and endangered lines
are profitable lines but the railroad owners are unwilling to use scarce
capital to rehabilitate them. This is particularly evident in the
analysis of Illinois Central Gulf lines in Louisiana and Milwaukee lines
in Wisconsin. These lines should require no subsidy once Federal funds
are used for rehabilitation. But it is equally clear that many of the
marginal lines cannot be self supporting even with rehabilitation.
Sixth, the willingness of shippers to provide a portion of the
subsidy is clear indication that the rates to points on the line were
uneconomically low; with rate deregulation some of these lines should
become profitable. But other marginal lines cannot be preserved by
shipper subsidy alone—especially when there are several shippers and
they cannot agree on division of the subsidy.
The most significant general conclusion is that legislation allowing
the railroads to abandon any lines they please, without provision for
retention through subsidy, would cause serious economic loss.
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Evaluation of the Overall Program
The Federally sponsored' subsidy program has accomplished one major
objective: it has established the principle that unprofitable but eco-
nomically justifiable rail lines should be retained under public subsidy,
not cross subsidy by the railroad company. In the past the I.C.C. had
only two alternatives: allow abandonment or force the road to continue
to cross subsidize. At a relatively small cost, a number of lines have
been retained that are clearly justifiable economically, and the states
have been relatively selective in not retaining, at least beyond a tran-
sitional period, lines that clearly are uneconomic.
Secondly, the 3R and 4R Acts have led to the development of state
rail planning. No longer do the State governments regard the railroads
as merely an industry to be regulated and taxed, but they are commencing
to see rail transport in a positive fashion, as a key element in the
transportation picture of the state and the nation, and one that warrants
encouragement and support. The State rail planning process has required
each state to take a careful look at the State's rail industry, its
strengths and weaknesses, to investigate the effects of rail deteriora-
tion upon the economy of the State, and to consider alternative solutions
to the difficulties. The plans represent a step—although a small one
in many instances—toward overall transportation policy planning, in-
cluding all modes of transport.
The most comprehensive overall planning, considering overall transport
requirements and all modes, is now being undertaken by South Dakota.
Most plans still fail to recognize the full impact of "subsidizing" many
roads on the viability of competing light traffic rail lines.
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The plans generally recognize that continuation of rail service
may offer significant positive externalities, in the form of lessened
pollution, lessened highway congestion and construction needs, and
preservation of existing patterns of economic activity, as well as
ensuring a broad geographical base for growth of various types of acti-
vities. There is, however, a tendency to stress jobs lost as the major
impact of abandonment—when in fact the frequent effect would be to
shift jobs from one location in the State to another. Thus external-
ities from a local standpoint are greater than those from a State
standpoint. "•
Despite the wide variety of approaches, it would appear from
superficial evidence that the States have been successful in identi-
fying the lines that most clearly warrant subsidy, although obviously
further refinements are required to handle the marginal cases.
The plans provide a somewhat incidental function of bringing
together data on the rail systems of the States not previously avail-
able.
Defects in the Overall Program - Stress on Shipper Support and the
Temporary Nature of the Programs
There have been several weaknesses in the program, some fundamental,
some caused by particular features of the laws.
First, there has been great emphasis on the need to make the lines
self supporting, either through the regular rate structure or additional
payments by shippers. Some states have refused to provide any state
funds, requiring the subsidy to come from shippers or local governments.
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But shipper subsidies place firms on the line at a disadvantage in com-
petition with shippers on unsubsidized lines and affect location deci-
sions, increasing the danger that the line cannot survive. When there
are a number of shippers, it is difficult to get them to agree on
allocation of the total subsidy payment among them. Local governments
are typically hard pressed for revenues and are unlikely, in most states
to provide the necessary funds
—
particularly if it appears that much of
the gain goes to a fete shippers. While it is true that many of the
benefits are local, a case can be made for state financing in the in-
terests of facilitating development in all parts of the state, and in
view of the better financial resources of the state. Because some of
the direct gain goes to the shippers on many lines, some financial par-
ticipation by shippers is obviously justifiable.
There are two situations in which continuing non shipper-subsidy
may be warranted: 1. When there are true externalities from retention
of a line, as for example, reduced pollution, energy use, highway con-
gestion and highway construction costs, and from a community standpoint,
maintenance of jobs and opportunities for economic development requiring
rail service. 2. When incremental (marginal) cost is less than average
cost, as it almost always is on light traffic lines because average cost
declines rapidly as traffic volume increases. If the line is economically
justifiable, in the sense of providing lower transportation costs than
otherwise possible, and no rate structure can be devised that will allow
users to cover average cost, subsidy is warranted.
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Clofcel*'" related to the emphasis on shipoer support is the basically
temporary nature of the continuation subsidies. Federal aid will be
limited to three years in the future, and almost all of the states
regard their programs as temporary; not more than three or four recog-
nize the possible desirability of continuing the program once the
Federal share ends. But it is clear that a number of the lines cannot
be made profitable but their externality contribution, together with
the sharp difference betiseeii marginal and average cost, require con-
tinued subsidy if economi: welfsre is to be maximized.
As a consequence >t the feared temporary nature of the subsidy,
especially if fcfife state will not put up funus, it is difficult to
attract new traffic to *;he subsidized lines, thus lessening the chance
of their surviving. When states make very clear in their rail plans
chat certain tffiies a.:e net likely to survive beyond the Subsidy period
—
as eo Indiana" and Chic—shippers will not locate or expand on the line.
For *;ni5 rVasoa soma eastern states, particularly Massachusetts and
Connecticut j h?.*-e si-e^sed tha"; the subsidized lines will remain as
permanent elements in the ra'l systems, and have provided funds for
acquisition ar.d rehi/bflitafcich;
This stress on the te.morary nature reflects several consideration.
First, there is widespread belie^ that tha marginal lines can become
profitable once thf>y are "ehab litated; this is the attitude of Congress
In making this portion of the program permanent in the 1978 legislation.
Certainly soma lines can become profitable by this means, but many can-
not. In par^ the attitude reflects the basic dislike of any form of
operating subsidy.
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Objections to Subsidy and the Short Line Alternative
However justifiable subsidies may be in principle, satisfactory
implementation is difficult, as long experience in air transport and
elsewhere has demonstrated. The railroads operating the lines have no
incentive to hold costs down and little to improve service, and incen-
tive to allocate as much cost as possible to the subsidized lines.
RSPO formulas seek to prevent this, but this is difficult. As one
consequence, and also a consequence of difficulties vcith CONRAIL,
several states have encouraged transfer of lines to new or existing
short line railroad companies. Vermont leases its state-owned lines
to three such companies. Maryland and Virginia have encouraged the
formation of short lines, as has Delaware, although the latter has ex-
pressed some reservations about this approach. Michigan has strongly
favored the short line approach, and much of the subsidized mileage
in that state has been transferred to new enterprises. Illinois and
Indiana both favor such takeovers, though Indiana has feared that the
unsympathetic attitude of CONRAIL would interfere with further shifts.
Rhode Island and Connecticut have encouraged the Providence and
Worcester, although Connecticut expresses some misgivings about the
approach. Louisiana supports the approach in principle. Most of the
western rail plans do not raise the issue at all; Oregon notes the
possibility.
The strong critic -of the short line approach had been New York,
the attitude dating back to a study published in March, 1974. The
Short Line Railroad Costs in New York State (Albany: New York State
Department of Transportation).
basic argument was that there is no net advantage to short line opera-
tion. What is required is an adaption by the major roads of their
operation of branch lines to changed conditions, rather than transfer
of branches to short lines. While the latter may have somewhat lower
labor costs, they must carry the entire administrative costs and may
experience management problems and inadequate utilization of equipment.
In 1978, however, New York altered its position because of its dis-
satisfaction with CONRAIL and now will encourage short line proposals.
The short line approach, while allowing lower costs and much more
attention to the needs of the shippers, does not in itself avoid the in-
herent subsidization problem. But the direct awareness of the company offi-
cials of the danger of loss of subsidy, if it becomes too large, and
direct contact with the operations make them much more conscious about the
need to hold costs down than is the management of a Class I railroad that
has no great interest in retaining a particular branch. A major obstacle
is the reluctance of Class I railroads to provide a stjare of the joint
rate with new short lines, and complete deregulation, as proposed in
March 1979, would greatly weaken the bargaining^power of the short lines.
The inherent subsidization problem, in turn, suggests the possi-
bility of actual operation of lines by governmental units, state, local,
or district. In freight planning all of the states except West Virginia
have avoided this approach to date. Many plans note specifically that
ly c
West Virginia has acquired one line, Green Springs to Petersburg, 51
miles, and is negotiating to buy the 17 mile Cass-Durbin line. The
Petersburg line is operated by a state agency, the West Virginia Railroad
Maintenance Authority, with its own employees and equipment. Substantial
amounts will be spent on rehabilitation, with the hope that the line will
be self supporting by 1981. The Chessie system gave the line to the stat*.
The Cass line is sought mainly to ensure a connection for the Cass Scenic
Railway, a tourist line'' "owned and operated by the state department pf
Natural Resources and will be operated by the latter.
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the state will not become involved in actual operation, even states
that have been purchasing the lines. Partly this simply involves the
old bias against government enterprises in the transport field, despite
the fact that most urban transit systems as well as the Long Island
Railroad are governmental operations. Two cities have successfully
operated railroads for many years and one new public district came
into existence prior to the 3R legislation (the Ogdensburg Bridge and
Port Authority). The presumption that government enterprises are less
efficient than private is widely accepted—though there is no conclu-
sive evidence. Operation by a governmental authority would eliminate
the inevitable clash between governmert and private firm that prises
in any subsidy situation. Pressures to hold costs down to minimize
the deficit ev»« if only partially covered from local taxes would be
strong.
Two related points have received little attention, though some
mention is made of them, especially in New York and Pennsylvania:
(1) the much greater economic viability of short light-traffic lines
o
than of long ones; and (2) the consequent desirability of transfer-
ring segments of lines from one carrier to another, when overall costs
can be reduced by doing so.
There is one other small operation. A few other cities have operated
lines for various periods. Municipal operation is discussed in the
article by John T. Due, "The Experience with Municipal Railway Lines,"
Transportation Journal , Vol. 14 (Summer 1975), pp. 5-17.
2
,;
John.. F. Due, "Factors Affecting the Abandonment and Survival of Class
II Railfuads," Transportation Journal, Vol. 16 (Spring 1977), pp. 19-36.
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Other Limitations
A major defect in the territory affected by the 3R Act was the
failure to transfer the excluded lines from their railroad owners to
CONRAIL or a Federal holding agency. As a consequence, rental charged
the present operating companies and thus covered by subsidy are being
pushed up rapidly, and the prices Penn Central and other owners are
.
asking are far in excess of liquidation value at the time of formation
of CONRAIL. Federal legislation also does not provide satisfactory
means of transferring segments of endangered lines from the present
railroad to another, which would often allow abandonment of substantial
mileage without injury. The plans for restructuring the rail lines in
the Prairie provinces of Canada do provide for such rationalization,
and New York state has been able to accomplish some.
A defect in the original subsidy legislation, corrected now for
the rehabilitation program, was that lines were not eligible for Federal
assistance until abandonment was approved. This interferred with
rational planning by the states, and often meant that deterioration of
lines went much farther than was economical before rehabilitation. The
railroads were in the awkward position of seeking to prove that a line
was unprofitable and uneconomic and then seek to aid in justifying the
retention and rehabilitation of it under subsidy.
Conclusion
On the whole, the programs, Federal and state, have been warranted,
despite their defects. The most needed change, continuation of the
Several limitations are stressed in the article by Mark I. Hirschey,
"Rail Service Subsidies—Actual Analysis of the Program," Quarterly
Review of Economics and Business
, Vol. 18 (Summer 1978), pp. 39-54.
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operatlng assistance subsidy beyond three years, is not without its
problems, particularly in providing incentive to bold down costs and
provide good service. Transfer to a local company or to a local
governmental unit are at least partial solutions. But the establish-
ment of the principle of subsidization and end of cross subsidy,
planning of rail system by the states, and retention of lines that
were unprofitable but economically justified are important accomplish-
ments. At the moment, proposed deregulation of the railroad increases
uncertainty about the future of abandonment and alternatives and the
subsidy programs.
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